This Article is written by Minam Mohammad Shamsi & this article discuss the concept of TRESPASS TO PERSON: Assault, Battery and False Imprisonment under law of tor
INTRODUCTION
In the realm of tort law, Trespass to person refers to direct, unlawful interference with an individual’s body or physical freedom. This category encompasses three key offenses: assault, battery, and false imprisonment. These torts are designed to protect personal safety, bodily integrity, and freedom from undue restraint. Assault occurs when someone intentionally causes another person to fear immediate harm, while battery involves the actual physical contact or harm. False imprisonment arises when an individual is unlawfully confined or restricted in movement. Understanding the distinctions between these torts and their legal implications is crucial for anyone seeking to navigate the complexities of personal injury law. Each of these torts allows the injured party to claim damages for the harm suffered. This article will explore the elements, defenses, and legal consequences of trespass to person, offering a comprehensive guide to these critical legal concepts.
The evolution of the tort of trespass to a person can be traced back to early English law, where physical interference received special protection to prevent individuals from resorting to revenge attacks. Until the 19th century, direct attacks on a person were safeguarded by the action of trespass, which didn’t require proof of damage. On the other hand, indirect interference was covered by the action on the case, necessitating proof of damage.
In contemporary legal terms, intentional and direct acts of interference still fall under the tort of trespass, while unintentional and indirect acts are addressed through the tort of negligence. Despite this general distinction, the legal landscape is nuanced, and some authorities propose that even in trespass cases, claimants may need to establish intention or negligence in addition to the act of interference.
This complexity raises the notion of negligent trespass, which might seem contradictory but reflects the intricate legal considerations surrounding these matters.
DEFINITION
Interference, however slight with a person’s elementary civil right to security of person, and self-determination in relation to his own body, constitutes trespass to person. Trespass may be done intentionally, deliberately or negligently. The fundamental principle plain and incontestable law is that every person’s body is inviolate.
- CLASSIFICATION
- Assault – Assault is an act of the defendant which causes to the plaintiff reasonable apprehension of the infliction of a battery on him by the defendant.
- Battery– The wrong of battery consists in intentional application of force to another person without lawful justification.
- False Imprisonment– False Imprisonment consists in the imposition of a total restraint for some period, however short, upon the liberty of another, without sufficient lawful justification.
ASSAULT
Assault is nothing, just an apprehension to the infliction of battery or it is an act prior to battery.
When the defendant by his act creates an apprehension in the mind of plaintiff that he is going to commit battery against the plaintiff, the wrong of assault is completed. Pointing a loaded pistol t another is an assault. Is the pistol is not loaded, and then even it may be an assault, if pointed at such a distance that, if loaded, it may cause injury. If the plaintiff knows that the pistol is unloaded, there is no assault.
There should be prima facie ability to do the harm. E.g. A person moving from a train can’t be assaulted by a person standing on platform. Similarly mere verbal threat is no assault unless it creates reasonable apprehension in the plaintiff’s mind that immediate force will also be used. If a man put his hand upon sword and said: “if it were not assizes, I would not take such languages from you”, there was no assault. (Tuberville v. Savdge, (1699) 1 Mod 3 : 2 Keble 545; 86 E.R. 684)
In Bavisetti Venkata Surya Rao V. Nandipati Muthayya
The plaintiff was an agriculturist, was in arrears of land revenue amounting to Rs. 11.60. The village munsif went to the plaintiff’s residence for the collection of the same. The plaintiff was unable to pay the amount on that day as his wife had locked the house and gone out for a few days. As it was the last day of the year for the collection of money so the defendant insisted to pay the amount. The plaintiff was told due to failure of paying the money, his movable property would be distrained. Since the plaintiff’s house was locked and no other movables were readily available, the defendant told him that the earrings which the plaintiff was wearing would be distrained. The village goldsmith was called.
On the arrival of the goldsmith, one of the persons present there paid off the amount due from the plaintiff by borrowing the same from another person. The defendant then went away quietly. The plaintiff sued the village munsif alleging that apart from other wrongs, the defendant had committed assault. It was held that since the defendant, after the arrival of the goldsmith, said nothing and did nothing and the threat of use of force by the goldsmith to the plaintiff was too remote a possibility to have put the plaintiff in fear of immediate or instant violence, there was no assault.
In Stephens v. Myers
The plaintiff was the chairman at a parish meeting, the defendant also sat at the same table but there were six or seven people between him and the plaintiff. In the course of some angry discussion, the defendant had been vociferous and he interrupted the proceedings of the meeting. A very large majority decided that the defendant be expelled from the meeting. The defendant then advanced towards the Chairman with a clenched fist saying
that he would rather pull the Chairman out of the chair than be turned out of the room, but was stopped by the churchwarden, who sat next but one to the Chairman. He was held liable for assault.
BATTERY
The wrong of battery consists of the intentional application of force to another person without any lawful justification. Its essentials are:-
- There should be a use of force
- Use of force should be without lawful justification
Use of Force
The wrong is constituted even though the force used is very trivial and does not cause any harm. Physical hurt is very important for the battery. The least touching of another in anger is a battery. The use of a stick, bullet, or any other missile throwing water spitting in a man’s face, or making a person fall by pulling his chair are examples of use of force. Infliction of heat, light, electricity, gas, odor, etc. would be a battery if it can result in physical injury or personal discomfort.
In Innes v. Wylie, a policeman unlawfully prevented the plaintiff from entering the club premises. It was held that “if the policeman was entirely passive like a door or a wall put to prevent from entering the room,” there was no assault.
Without Lawful Justification
In, Liegh v. Gladstone – Use of force should be intentional and without any lawful justification. If two or more persons meet in a narrow passage and without any violence or design of harm, the one touches the other gently, it will be no battery. But if either of them uses violence against the other, to force his way in a rude or inordinate manner, it will be a battery. Voluntarily suffering harm does not amount to battery. Use of force may also be justified in pulling a drowning man out of water, or forcibly feeding a hunger-striking prisoner to save his life.
In Stanley v. Powell, Powell a member of the shooting party, fired at a pheasant but the pallet from his gun glanced off a tree and accidentally wounded Stanley who was the other member of the party. It was held that Powell was not liable. If the act is wilful or negligent, the defendant would be liable.
In Pratap Daji v B.B. & C.I. Ry, the plaintiff entered a carriage on the defendant’s railway but by oversight failed to purchase a ticket for his travel. At an intermediate station, he asked for a ticket but the same was refused. At another place, he was asked to get out of the carriage since he did not have a ticket. On his refusal to get out, force was used to make him get out of the carriage. In an action by him for his forcible removal, it was held that the use of the force was justified as he, being without a ticket, was a trespasser. The defendants were, therefore, not liable.
In P. Kader v. K.A. Alagarswami, In Madras High Court held that putting handcuffs on an undertrial prisoner and then chaining him like a dangerous animal with a neighboring window in a hospital during his medical treatment is an unjustifiable use of force and the police officer responsible for the same is liable for trespass to the person. It was also observed that in such a case, there is no need to prove any motive or intention on the part of the police officer, because if the officer has exceeded and abused his authority, it may be out of arrogance or even because of a temperamental defect which delights in cruelty, the act would be malicious and mala fide unless it can plausibly be contended, that the circumstances justified the use of the power.
4 . FALSE IMPRISONMENT
It consists in the imposition of a total restraint for some period, however short, upon the liberty of another, without sufficient lawful justification. When a person is deprived of his personal liberty, whether by being confined within the four walls or by being prevented from leaving the place where he is, it is false imprisonment If a man is restrained, by a threat of force, from leaving his own house or an open field, there is false imprisonment.
The essentials are required:-
- There should be total restrained on the liberty of a person
- It should be without any lawful justification
Total Restrained
Whether the restrained is total or partial, the same is actionable. When the restrained is total and a person is prevented from going out of certain circumscribed limit the offence is of wrongful confinement as define in sec 340 of IPC and when a restrain is partial and a person is prevented from going to a particular direction as define in sec 399 of IPC. Under civil law, the position is different. The tort of false imprisonment is constituted when there is a total restraint. It is no imprisonment if a man is prevented from going to a particular direction, but he is free to go to any other direction.
In Bird v Jones, a part of public footway, on hammer smith bridge was wrongfully enclosed by defendant. Seats were put there and entry was given only to those who pay to watch the rowing there. The plaintiff asserted his light of using this footway, climbed over the fence of the enclosure but was prevented to go forward. He remained there for about half an hour and subsequently brought an action for false imprisonment.
Means of Escape
If there are viable means of escape, the confinement cannot be deemed as total, and thus, it does not amount to false imprisonment. However, these means must be understandable to the person being held. For example, if the captive is a blind individual or a child, they should be able to discern the escape routes. Furthermore, these means must offer a practical and reasonable way for the individual to be released from detention.
Knowledge of the Plaintiff
There has been a difference of opinion on the point whether the knowledge of the plaintiff, that there has been restraint on his freedom, is essential to constitute the wrong of false imprisonment.
In Herring v. Boyle held that knowledge is an essential to constitute a tort of false imprisonment. In this case a schoolmaster wrongfully refused to permit a school boy to go with his mother until she pays the school fee. The conversation between school master and mother was held in the absence of boy. It was held that the refusal to the mother in the boy’s absence, and without his being cognizant of the restraint, could not amount to false imprisonment.
While in Meering v. Graham-white Aviation co., held that knowledge of imprisonment is not an essential element for bringing an action for false imprisonment because the wrong could be constituted even without a person having the knowledge of the same.
Unlawful detention
In order to constitute the wrong of false imprisonment, it is necessary that the restraint should be unlawful or without any justification.
The detention cannot be constituted to be lawful if person is not released from jail after his acquittal held in Rudul Sah v. State if Bihar.
In Bhim Singh v. State of J. & K., the detention was unjustified. In this case, the petitioner, an M.L.A. of the J. & K. Assembly was wrongfully detained by the police in order to prevent him from attending the Assembly session. The act of arrest was considered to be mischievous and malicious and the Supreme Court considered it to be an appropriate case for granting exemplary damages amounting to Rs. 50,000/-.
Lawful detention
When there is some justification for detaining a person, there is no false imprisonment. Thus, if a man entered certain premises subject to certain reasonable conditions, it is no wrong to prevent him from leaving those premises and unless (hose conditions are fulfilled. In Robinson v. Balmain New Ferry Co. Ltd., the plaintiff entered the defendant’s wharf with an idea to cross the river by one of the defendant’s ferry boats. Finding that no boat was available for another twenty minutes, he wanted to go out of the wharf. The plaintiff had paid a penny for entry but refused to pay another penny, which was chargeable for exit, according to the rules of the defendant as displayed on the notice board. The defendants disallowed him to leave the wharf unless payment for exit was made. In an action for false imprisonment, it was held that the defendants were not liable as the charges were reasonable.
References
- Dr. R. K. Bangia, Law of TORTS ( 21st edn , Allahabad Law Agency, 2008)
- Avtar Singh, P.S.A. Pillai”s Law of Tort with Law of Statutory Compensation and Consumer Protection (Eastern book Company, Lucknow 9th edn , 2004)
- R v. S. George (Supreme Court of Canada 1960).
- R v. Constanza [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 492
- Stanley v. Powell (1891) 1 Q.B. 86
- Pratap Daji v. B.B.& C.I. Rly. (1877) ILR 1 Bom 52
- Innes v. Wylie (1844) 1 C & K 257
- Fetter v. Beale 91 Eng. Rep. 1122
- Herring v. Boyle 149 ER 1126 (Exch)
- Meering v. Graham White Aviation (1919) 122 LTR 44 (KB)
