This Article is written by Om & this article discuss the concept of Common intention and common object under IPC
Joint Liability under Section 34 2
Essentials of Common Intention 2
Barendra Kumar Ghose v. Emperor (1925) 2
Introduction
In criminal law, ‘intention’ is an important concept. The highest form of the mental element applies to terrible acts. The term ‘intention’ is not defined in the Indian Penal Code of 1860; nonetheless, Section 34 addresses ‘shared intention’.
In common purpose, there must be a previous meeting of mind and unity, as well as a clear act that must be executed in order for everyone’s common intention to advance.
Section 34 of the IPC: Acts committed by many individuals in furtherance of a common goal. Section 34 has no reference of any specific offence.
Joint Liability under Section 34
All people who have a shared intention and are participating in the conduct are jointly accountable for the crime. It makes no difference how much participation they have in the conduct; their culpability is the same as that of the principal criminal.
Example
Assume individuals A, B, C, and D intend to assassinate Z. A and B offer protection; C supply weapons; and D murders Z. So, under Section 34 of the IPC, all four people are accountable for the offence.
The term ‘act’ refers to Section 33 of the Indian Penal Code (1860). ‘Act’, ‘omission’. The phrase ‘act’ also refers to a succession of acts as a single act, as does the term ‘omission’.
Sections 34 and 33 plainly establish that the term “criminal act” refers to more than one act and encompasses an entire chain of acts.
Common intention
The presence of a common purpose to perform a criminal act in support of all group members’ shared aim is at the heart of Section 34 joint responsibility. The word ‘shared intention’ refers to a previous concert, i.e. a meeting of minds and participation by all group members in the implementation of that plan. Each participant’s deeds may differ in personality, but they must be carried out with the same shared aim.
Essentials of Common Intention
There must be some criminal activity.
The act must be performed by two or more people.
Persons must behave with the same aim.
Every individual participating in the conduct is accountable for it.
Every individual will be held accountable as if he committed the conduct alone.
Barendra Kumar Ghose v. Emperor (1925)
Barendra Kumar Ghosh and three other members attempted a post office robbery and demanded money. In the meanwhile, they open their weapons, murder the postmaster, and flee, but Barendra Kumar Ghosh is apprehended with the pistol in his hand and handed over to the police.
Later, he was tried under Section 302/34 of the IPC, and both the session court and the High Court pronounced the death sentence. The accused rejected his allegation, claiming that he was only standing outside the door and did not fire the deceased.
The Calcutta High Court ruled that they also serve people who stand and wait. It is not required for everyone to participate equally. One may accomplish more or less. However, this does not exempt the individual who performed less from accountability. His obligation remains the same.
Section 149 of IPC
The crime against public tranquilly is covered in Chapter VIII of the IPC (Sections 141–160). Section 149 of the IPC deals with the ‘common object’.
An offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in the prosecution of the assembly’s common object or in such a way that the member of that assembly knew was likely to be committed in the prosecution of that object; every person who is a member of the same assembly at the time of the committing of that offence is guilty of that offence.
The Supreme Court ruled that this clause does not constitute a unique offence, but rather asserts the vicarious culpability of all members of the unlawful assembly.
In the case of Bhudeo Mandal v. the State of Bihar, the Supreme Court declared that the proof must clearly indicate not only the common aim but also that the common object was illegitimate before convicting someone under Section 149.
In Ram Dhani v. State, there was a land dispute, and the plaintiff relied on the accused party’s crop cutting. The latter were formed in groups of more than five to avoid cutting. Individuals acting in self-defense on the land, according to the tribunal, cannot be participants of an unlawful assembly. As a result, they could not be accused of assembling illegally.
Ingredients of Section 149
An offence committed by members of an unlawful assembly-In Yunis vs. Madhya Pradesh State, the Supreme Court ruled that the accused’s attendance in an unlawful assembly was sufficient grounds for conviction. Even if the accused is not accused of any overt act, the fact that he participated in the unlawful assembly and was present at the event is sufficient to hold him accountable. However, mere attendance at an unlawful assembly cannot hold a person accountable unless he is operating for a common purpose, and that purpose is one of those listed in Section 141.
Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code defines an unlawful assembly. It specifies that if the common goal of such gathering is any of the following, an assembly of five or more people is illegal.
Exempting someone from breaking incorporeal law by using or showing criminal force.
(A) In prosecution of the common object- “In prosecution of the common object” does not imply persuasion of the assembly’s common object. The phrase “in prosecution the common object” indicates that the offence committed was immediately related to the common object of the assembly in which the accused were members. The act must be carried out in the manner described in order to achieve the shared goal assigned to the participants of the unlawful assembly. The phrase “in the prosecution of the common object” must be properly understood as meaning “in order to achieve the common object.”
(B) Members knew to be likely–The second component relates to a circumstance in which assembly members were aware that the offence was likely to be committed while prosecuting the common object. A thing is likely to happen only when it is almost certain to happen. At the moment of the performance of an offence, the word “knew” refers to a state of mind rather than the latter. Knowledge must be proven. The term “likely” denotes significant evidence that such knowledge was available to the unlawful assembly. The prosecution must demonstrate that the accused not only knew the offence was likely to be committed, but also that it was likely to be committed while prosecuting the assembly’s shared goal.
(C) Five or more persons- In order to apply this provision, you must demonstrate that the common item was shared by at least five people. While it is possible that some of them are identified or that their identification is questionable, the existence of five or more persons must be unequivocally confirmed. In certain circumstances, fewer than five persons may be convicted. However, if it is uncertain that at least five persons were charged under this clause, no conviction may be obtained.
Conclusion
Sections 34 and 149 hold an individual vicariously liable for his friends’ behaviour.
Both portions cannot always be proved with direct proof, thus they must be deduced from the facts and circumstances of the case.
A common object varies from a common intention in the sense that it doesn’t need a preceding concert and consent before the crime takes place.
Furthermore, in circumstances of joint culpability, the co-accused who participated in a crime with the same purpose and aim is entitled to equal criminal liability, subject to specific restrictions.
References
JOINT LIABILITY IN THE PENAL CODE -Gillian Douglas
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24863966
