ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS vs ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA, 2024

ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS vs ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA, 2024

Case Title and Citation: ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS V. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA 2024 INSC 341 (26 April 2024)

Factual Background

The case was initiated by a non-governmental organization, the Association for Democratic Reforms, which questioned the reliability and integrity of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs). While the Petitioners did not allege malice or motive on the part of the Election Commission of India (ECI), they expressed suspicion regarding the possibility of EVM manipulation, urging the Court to intervene to instill confidence in voters. The Petitioners sought three main alternatives: a return to the paper ballot system, the physical provision of the printed Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slip to the voter for deposit in a ballot box, or a directive for 100% counting of VVPAT slips to accompany the electronic tally. Currently, the ECI conducts VVPAT verification in five randomly selected polling stations per constituency to cross-check the electronic vote count.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the integrity and security of elections necessitate the discontinuation of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) in favor of the paper ballot system.
2. Whether the Supreme Court should mandate the counting of all (100%) VVPAT slips to ensure that votes cast through EVMs are accurately recorded and counted.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court (Division Bench) rejected the Petitioner’s demands for reverting to paper ballots and for 100% counting of VVPAT slips. The Court affirmed that the current EVM-VVPAT system, supported by rigorous safeguards, ensures the integrity of the electoral process. To further enhance credibility, the Court issued two new, forward-looking directions concerning the handling of VVPAT Symbol Loading Units (SLUs) and the verification of EVM burnt memory.

Reason for the decision

1. EVM Security and Impossibility of Tampering: The Court found that the EVM mechanism is secured by numerous safeguards. The system is built with standalone units (Ballot Unit, Control Unit, VVPAT) that are not connectable to the internet or any third-party device, ruling out hacking. The program (firmware) is burned into a One Time Programmable microcontroller chip during manufacture, making the core code unalterable once supplied to the ECI. This design renders the suspicion of manipulating results “unfounded”.
2. Impracticality of Paper Ballots: The submission to return to the paper ballot system was deemed “unsound” due to its known weaknesses. EVMs eliminate invalid votes, prevent booth capturing (by limiting voting speed to four votes per minute), reduce paper usage, and provide administrative efficiency in counting, making them significantly advantageous in a country with nearly 97 crore voters.
3. Rejection of 100% VVPAT Counting: The Court held that the fundamental right of a voter to ensure their vote is recorded does not equate to a right to 100% counting of VVPAT slips. Current empirical data showed that the existing verification of five VVPATs per constituency has resulted in virtually no discrepancies or mismatches. Increasing the manual count would substantially delay results, double the manpower required, and introduce significant risks of human error and potential manipulation.
4. New Directions for Enhanced Credibility: To further strengthen the process, the Court mandated two new measures:
   • The Symbol Loading Units used to load candidate information onto VVPATs must be sealed, signed by candidate representatives, and stored in the strong room along with the EVMs for 45 days post-results.
   • Candidates who are ranked second or third can request engineers from the manufacturers to check and verify the burnt memory/microcontroller in 5% of the EVMs per constituency within seven days of the result declaration, with verification costs refunded if tampering is proven.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld the integrity and robustness of the existing EVM-VVPAT system, finding that persistent challenges based merely on “suspicion and doubt” are undesirable for a healthy democracy. By rejecting the regressive demands for paper ballots and mass VVPAT counting, the Court ensured the continuation of an efficient electoral process while simultaneously introducing targeted technical and procedural directives (SLU storage and memory verification) to reinforce voter confidence and accountability against potential misuse.