Reassessing Sedition Laws and Fundamental Rights in India

This article is written by Honey Thakkar, Student of M.K.E.S. College of Law.

Abstract

This research studies the assertions formulating sedition laws, including the historical, constitutional, and legal aspects in context with Section 124A of The Indian Penal Code. The article discusses how this law from the colonial period violates the legal framework of India’s Constitution, with the right to free speech guaranteed as part of Article 19(1)(a). The analysis captures calamitous judicial battles, contemporary discourse, and the latest governmental actions. The analysis highlights the missing links in evolving policies towards national security and democratic liberties. Also studied are approaches from other countries, which shed light on how dissent is treated in a constitutional democracy like India, to suggest modern policy design.

Keywords

Sedition, Section 124A IPC, Fundamental Rights, Article 19, Indian Constitution, Freedoms of Speech, National Security, Democracy, Judicial Review, Legal Reform

Introduction

The sedition laws of India, and more specifically, Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), attract significant legal and political attention in the country. The British colonial government first instituted the law in 1870 to suppress opposition. It prohibits any speech or expression that ‘brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite disaffection’ towards any sitting government. The strife of the Constitutional right of free speech and expression protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has been at loggerheads with this provision time and again after India attained independence.

Constitutional Framework and Fundamental Rights

The key principles of Article 19(1) include the freedom of speech or expression of an individual, but there also exist reasonable restrictions defined in Article 19(2) that safeguard the dominion, integrity or public order of the state. Throughout the years, Section 124A has been explained on these grounds. There is no ‘disaffection’ or ‘hatred’ which has no exact definition, and it’s a fact that can be abused easily. In the case of Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962)[1], sedition was held constitutional by the Supreme Court but only in its claimed bounds of incitement to violence or public disorder.

Judicial Interpretation and Misuse

Judicial interpretation can be considered as one of the shields supporting the phrase ‘abuse of sedition laws’. It can even be said that the ‘Kedar Nath Singh judgement’ is the leading. In theory, it does follow the precedent, but in practice, it is conjured up with journalists and students being dubbed as inciting violence when there is none, and the violent glue of sedition claims. Take, for example, the recent controversial cases involving anti-CAA protesters and in charge of farmers’ movement.

Sedition on an International Scale

Certain democracies have completely repealed or mitigated their sedition laws. The United Kingdom, having introduced sedition to India, did away with the offence in 2009[2].

Likewise, the United States provides sturdy protection for free speech under the First Amendment, where only ‘fighting words’ are punishable. These consider the Indian sedition law in light of democratic aspects, suggesting an enhancement or calibration to the contemporary context.

Modern Changes and Government Stance

In the case of S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India[3], the Supreme Court in 2022 ordered a stay on the enforcement of Section 124A and requested the government to take another look at the legislation. The Union Government, by means of the Solicitor General, communicated to the Court that they were considering the legislation. There have been no amendments to the law as of 2025, and policy debates persist.

Findings

1. Repeal Section 124A completely or amend it in such a way that ‘disaffection’ and ‘hatred’ are more specifically defined.
2. Focus its enforcement on public disorder and violence, as stipulated in the Kedar Nath Singh judgment.
3. Permit judicial involvement or prior approval to the filing of a sedition case.
4. Enroll personnel from the police and military in limitary school on the constitutional boundaries of speech and crime, as these agencies are subject to rigid constitutional principles.
5. Suggest amending the existing UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act) legislation to deal with bona fide threats to national integrity constructively.

Conclusion

The application of sedition laws in India today, in its current form, is an affront to democracy and personal liberties. Preserving the territorial integrity of a nation and public order is important, but should not come at the expense of legitimate expressions of dissent.

There is a need to revisit the legal framework that upholds these parameters within

constitutional ethos and comparative law so that sedition is not a matter for paternalistic misuse aimed at removing dissenting voices, but rather an action of last resort to valid threats to a nation.

References

1. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
2. The United Kingdom Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Section 73 (abolishing sedition).
3. S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 682/2021.
4. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 124A.
5. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2).
6. Law Commission of India, Consultation Paper on Sedition, 2018.
7. European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. United Kingdom, (1976) 1 EHRR 737.